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1. Introduction
Bigger cities are associated both with higher individual earnings and with higher housing costs.
Higher earnings take partly the form of a static city-size premium that individuals obtain when
they are working in a bigger city and partly the form of a dynamic gain due to faster accumulation
of more valuable experience in bigger cities (Glaeser and Maré, 2001, Yankow, 2006, Baum-Snow
and Pavan, 2012, De la Roca and Puga, 2012). These big-city benefits are not very different by level
of education or by broad occupation type, but they appear to be significantly larger for workers
with higher ability within broad education or occupation categories (De la Roca and Puga, 2012,
Baum-Snow and Pavan, 2012). Since higher ability workers benefit more from bigger cities, while
housing costs there are higher for everyone regardless of ability, one would expect more able
workers to locate disproportionately in bigger cities. And yet, this is not the case.
Several studies find that more educated workers or those with certain occupations are more
likely to locate in bigger cities (Berry and Glaeser, 2005, Moretti, 2012, Davis and Dingel, 2013).1
However, within broad occupation or education groups, there appears to be little sorting on ability,
whether this is measured through cognitive test results (Bacolod, Blum, and Strange, 2009), indi-
vidual fixed-effects in a wage regression (De la Roca and Puga, 2012), measures of ability derived
from a finite-mixture model in a structural estimation setting (Baum-Snow and Pavan, 2012), or
individual residuals from a spatial equilibrium condition (Eeckhout, Pinheiro, and Schmidheiny,
2014).
A partial explanation for little sorting on ability is simply that many people are not mobile. In
the United States, 56% of people live at age 40 in the same city or town where they were at age 14.
Even for college-educated workers, the figure is 40%.2 However, given that many people do move,
one would expect them to take into account how they would fare in different cities depending
on their ability. Our starting point in this paper is that it is not all that easy for individuals to
make such a calculation. When young individuals choose a location, they have a very imperfect
assessment of their own ability and, by the time they learn enough about it, early decisions have
had a lasting impact and reduce their incentives to move.
A large literature in psychology documents that individuals’ assessment of their own ability
generally has little resemblance to their actual ability (see Dunning, Heath, and Suls, 2004, for
a survey). Correlation between people’s views of their intelligence and their performance on
intelligence tests and other academic tasks is typically between 0.2 and 0.3 (Hansford and Hattie,
1982). In the workplace, the correlation between how people expect to perform complex tasks
and how they actually perform them is around 0.2 (Stajkovic and Luthans, 1998). Several com-
plementary explanations of the pervasiveness of flawed self-assessment have been put forth. Not
only assessing ability is inherently complex, but also assessing skills accurately often requires the
same skills one is trying to assess (e.g., knowing whether one is good at maths requires sufficient
mathematical knowledge). In addition, comparative assessments are very self-centred, relying
largely on some loose perception of whether one is able to do something and not so much on how
1This could reflect sorting by education, but also the fact that cities with more educated workers experience faster
employment growth (Shapiro, 2006).
2These percentages are calculated from our panel data, described below.
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many others can do it substantially better. Even when people have information that would lead
them to more accurate self-assessments, they tend to neglect this information, which leads them to
worse assessments than they are capable of (Benabou and Tirole, 2002).
We formalize the idea that flawed self-assessment can help explain limited sorting across cities
of different sizes through an overlapping generations model of urban sorting by workers with
heterogenous ability and self-confidence, where the latter is defined as individuals’ assessment of
their own ability. Big cities allow junior workers to gain more valuable experience and provide
senior workers with better opportunities to apply their accumulated experience than small cities.
Both advantages are stronger for high-ability workers. However, big cities also involve higher
living costs. Junior workers choose their location based on the benefits and costs of big cities
and on their self-confidence, which may or may not correspond to their actual ability. They
then accumulate experience depending on their chosen location, ability and luck. In the process
they also learn their own ability. Based on accumulated experience and ability, as well as on the
opportunities and costs of big and small cities, senior workers choose whether to relocate or not.
The model predicts various patterns of bilateral sorting between big and small cities along
workers’ life-cycles. Location decisions by junior workers are mostly driven by self-confidence.
For senior workers, ability plays a stronger role in determining location, but the lasting impact of
their earlier choices dampens their incentives to move and reduces the aggregate extent of sorting.
Nevertheless, workers who seriously underestimated their own ability may relocate from a small
to a big city once their labour market experience provides them with better information of their
true capabilities. Workers who try their luck in a big city and fail tend to relocate to smaller cities.
Even some senior workers who had an accurate assessment of their own ability may relocate: some
senior workers at the high end of the ability distribution in small cities relocate to big cities when
this provides them with sufficiently greater opportunities to apply their accumulated experience;
senior workers at the lower end of the ability distribution in big cities relocate to small cities
when instead the main advantage of big cities consists of facilitating the accumulation of valuable
experience.
We test these predictions on panel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979
(nlsy79), which allows us to track individuals’ location and labour market activities as well as a
rich set of personal characteristics. Our primary measure of ability is the individual’s percentile
score in the Armed Forces Qualification Test (afqt), a cognitive ability test that was administered
to respondents when their median age was 19. In our model, we use the term self-confidence
to refer to individuals’ perception of their own ability. Prior to being provided their results on the
afqt, respondents in the nlsy79 were subject to a self-evaluation test devised by Rosenberg (1965),
which has been found to measure well individuals’ perception of their own ability to perform in
a wide variety of tasks, in particular those that are job-related (Judge, Erez, and Bono, 1998, Chen,
Gully, and Eden, 2001).
When we examine the raw relationship between the location choices of individuals in their
junior and senior periods and their levels of self-confidence and ability, we find that the data closely
match our theoretical predictions. We then estimate logit models to look at the determinants of
locating in a small or a big city either when junior or senior, while controlling for other drivers
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of mobility. Our findings confirm that individuals with higher levels of self-confidence are more
likely to locate in a big city upon entering the job market. Instead, high-ability young individuals
are not significantly more likely to locate initially in a big city. When examining senior period
relocations, we find that self-confidence no longer influences the decision to relocate from small to
big cities while the level of ability is a significant determinant. Moreover, relocations from big to
small cities appear to be driven instead by lack of success in the big city rather than by corrections
to flawed self-assessment.
Our findings contribute to the urban economics literature on learning and sorting in cities.
The model we develop has several elements in common with the model of learning in cities by
Glaeser (1999). Both are overlapping generations models with cities of different sizes where bigger
cities facilitate learning. The main difference is that the workers in Glaeser’s (1999) model are
homogeneous whereas workers in our model are heterogeneous in self-confidence and ability.
This allows us to examine sorting patterns over the life-cycle and the consequences of flawed
self-assessment. Eeckhout, Pinheiro, and Schmidheiny (2014) and Davis and Dingel (2012) develop
static models of sorting. In Eeckhout, Pinheiro, and Schmidheiny (2014) sorting is based on
complementarities that are stronger between workers with more different skills. They predict no
sorting on average but a greater variance of skills in bigger cities. In Davis and Dingel (2012)
there is perfect sorting driven by supermodularity. Behrens, Duranton, and Robert-Nicoud (2014)
combine sorting, agglomeration and selection into a common theoretical framework. To keep the
model manageable, they assume workers make an irreversible location choice, and obtain perfect
sorting by heterogeneous ability, although variations in ex-post luck lead to heterogeneity in the
productivity distribution. In contrast, in our model workers can choose their location in each of
their two periods, and the incentives to relocate as a result of the interplay between self-confidence,
ability and luck are one of our main issues of interest.
On the empirical side, few papers have looked at the impact of personality traits on urban
sorting. An exception is Bacolod, Blum, and Strange (2009), who study the prevalence of a variety
of skills and personality traits in cities of different sizes. However, they do not examine sorting
based on different traits, such as self-confidence and ability, at different stages of a worker’s life-
cycle.
Our findings also contribute to the literature on personality psychology and economics recently
systematized by Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz (2011), who document the power
of personality traits both as predictors and as causes of academic and economic success, health,
and criminal activity. For many outcomes, personality measures are just as predictive as cognitive
measures derived from iq and achievement tests, even after controlling for family background and
cognition. Standard measures of cognition are also heavily influenced by personality traits which
vary over the life cycle and can be altered by experience and investment. Intervention studies,
along with studies in biology and neuroscience, establish a causal basis for the observed effect of
personality traits on economic and social outcomes. Building on a large multi-disciplinary set of
studies, Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz (2011) conclude that, as personality traits are
more malleable over the life cycle compared to cognition (which rank stabilizes around age 10),
interventions that change personality are promising avenues for addressing poverty and disad-
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vantage. These findings challenge the (extreme version of the) ‘situationist view’ of personality,
which argues that there are no stable personality traits or preference parameters that individuals
carry across different situations, and thus, claims that personality psychology has little relevance
for economics.
The rest of the paper is organized in five sections. Section 2 presents the model of sorting and
learning in cities of different sizes. Section 3 solves for individual location choices taking relative
city sizes as given. Section 4 solves for the general equilibrium endogenizing relative city sizes.
Section 5 describes the data set that is used to obtain the empirical results presented in section 6.
Section 7 concludes.
2. The model
Each worker lives for two periods. We refer to workers in the first period of their life as junior
workers and to workers in the second period of their life as senior workers. In each of these two
periods, each worker chooses whether to locate in a big city or in a small city. We use subscript B
to denote big city variables and subscript S to denote small city variables. The sizes of cities are
derived as an equilibrium outcome of the location decisions of all agents in section 4.
Workers have heterogeneous ability. All junior workers are engaged in a simple task and a
worker’s ability, denoted by α, is her actual probability of successfully completing this simple task.
However, junior workers may have an inaccurate assessment of their own ability. We denote by
σ self-confidence, defined as a junior worker’s assessment of her own ability (i.e., her belief about
α). While trying to complete their simple task workers learn about their true ability, so all senior
workers know their α accurately.3
Junior workers who fail to complete their simple task get a low return, normalized to 0. Those
who instead succeed at completing this simple task, get a high return pi1 > 0. In addition to a
higher return, junior workers who successfully complete their simple task also gain experience
that will be valuable when senior. The key advantage of locating in the big city for junior workers
is that it allows them to accumulate more valuable experience, as suggested by Glaeser and Maré
(2001), and consistent with the evidence presented in De la Roca and Puga (2012) and Baum-Snow
and Pavan (2012). Successful junior workers in the big city gain experience eB while successful
junior workers in the small city gain experience es, where 0 < eS < eB < 1. Junior workers who
fail at completing their simple task gain zero experience.
Senior workers, at the very least, engage in a simple task. In addition, some senior workers
are presented with an opportunity to also engage in a more complex task. Regarding the simple
task, senior workers who already succeeded at this simple task as junior workers, can replicate
what they did and complete their simple task with certainty. Senior workers who failed as junior
workers can try again and succeed at their simple task when senior with probability given by
3For simplicity, in the main text we derive results under the assumption that a junior worker is totally convinced that
her ability is σ until she updates this belief to the actual value α in the process of completing the simple task. In appendix
C we re-derive results allowing for uncertainty, so that junior workers realize their self-assessment may be inaccurate.
Each worker receives an initial signal, on the basis of which she takes her ability to be σ in expectation, with variance θ.
Under this alternative assumption, the specific thresholds determining the location strategies of junior workers change
but all our results remain qualitatively unchanged.
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their ability α. The simple tasks yields a return pi1 if successful and zero return if unsuccessful.
Regarding the complex task, to complete this a senior worker must be faced with a relevant
opportunity and also have prior experience from completing a simple task as a junior worker.
The key advantage of locating in the big city for senior workers is that this offers them greater
opportunities to exploit their previously acquired experience. Opportunities for engaging in a
complex task arise with probability ΩB in big cities compared with probability ΩS in small cities,
where 0 < ΩS < ΩB < 1. If faced with a complex task, a senior worker’s probability of success
is αe, the product of her innate ability α and the experience acquired as a junior worker e, where
e = eB if she completed a simple task in the big city, e = eS if she completed a simple task in the
small city, and e = 0 if she failed to complete a simple task whatever her location was. Note that
this implies a positive interaction between ability and the more valuable experience provided by
big cities, again consistent with the evidence presented in De la Roca and Puga (2012).4 Restated,
the higher the ability of an experienced worker the more she benefits from the greater opportunities
provided by the big city. Successfully completing a complex task yields an extra return pi2 on top
of pi1.
The disadvantage of locating in the big city for both junior and senior workers is that it involves
higher costs for housing and commuting, which we refer to as urban costs.5 These urban costs
are γB in the big city and γS in the small city, with 0 < γS < γB.6 Since each individual agent
chooses her own location in each period taking city sizes as given, we initially treat γB and γS as
parameters. In section 4 we go one step further by explicitly introducing commuting costs and a
spatial housing market in a simple monocentric city model, which makes γB and γS a function of
the (endogenous) population size of each city.
Anyone who failed to complete a simple task as a junior worker will choose to locate in the small
city as a senior worker. This is because such a worker cannot benefit from the greater opportunities
present in big cities (ΩB > ΩS), since tackling a complex task requires success at a simple task first.
For such a worker there is also no point in locating in the big city to acquire greater experience
(eB > eS), since this would only be valuable in the future, and senior workers are in their final
period. At the same time, the big city has the disadvantage of its higher urban costs (γB > γS).
Given that senior workers who were unsuccessful in their junior period locate in the small city,
the expected utility attained by locating in city i as a junior worker and, conditional on earlier
success, locating in city j as a senior worker is:
Uij(α) = −γi + (1− α)(−γS + α pi1) + α(2pi1 − γj +Ωj α ei pi2) , i,j ∈ {B,S} . (1)
4An alternative interpretation of the interaction αe is that the probability of success at completing a complex task
equals the worker’s experience independently of her ability, but the experience a junior worker acquires depends not
only on her location but also on her ability, so that a worker with ability α accumulates experience αeB when successful
in the big city and experience αeS when successful in the small city.
5The higher cost of living in big cities, mostly because of the higher costs of housing, is widely documented. Combes,
Duranton, and Gobillon (2012) estimate an elasticity of urban costs with respect to population of about 0.04 using data
for all individual land transactions in France.
6Note that in the absence of any difference in urban cost (γB = γS), nobody would ever locate in S. Analogously,
with no difference in the value of experience (eB = eS), nobody would locate in B when junior, while with no difference
in opportunities (ΩB = ΩS), nobody would locate in B when senior.
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Someone who locates in city i ∈ {B,S} as a junior worker incurs an urban cost γi. With probability
1− α she fails at completing a simple task and gets no return as a junior worker. Having failed, she
then locates in S as a senior worker, incurring urban cost γS. With probability α she succeeds at
completing the simple task in her senior period and obtains a return pi1 while with probability 1− α
she fails again and gets no return. With probability α she instead succeeds at completing a simple
task as a junior worker, and then obtains a return pi1 in her junior period and is also guaranteed
pi1 in her senior period. If, having succeeded, she locates in city j ∈ {B,S} as a senior worker, she
incurs an urban cost γj. Then, with probability Ωj she faces the opportunity to also engage in a
more complex task. She successfully completes this complex task, yielding an additional return
pi2, with probability αei that depends on her ability and the experience ei she acquired as a junior
worker in city i. We can now use this equation to compare the possible location choices for each
worker.
3. Equilibrium location choices
A worker’s location choice when junior will affect her location choice when senior. Thus, we must
first examine the optimal location choice of senior workers conditional on their location when
junior. Only then can we examine the optimal location choice of junior workers.
Senior period location
Consider a worker who locates in B when junior. She prefers to also locate in B when senior
(conditional of earlier success) if and only if
UBB(α)−UBS(α) = α [α(ΩB −ΩS)eB pi2 − (γB − γS)] > 0 , (2)
or, equivalently, if and only if
α > αBBBS ≡ ∆γeB pi2 ∆Ω , (3)
where
∆γ ≡ γB − γS , (4)
∆Ω ≡ ΩB −ΩS . (5)
The ability threshold defined by equation (3), αBBBS, is such that anyone with ability above
this threshold gets higher utility by locating in B as a junior worker and, conditional on success,
also locating in B as a senior worker than by locating in B as a junior worker and relocating to S as
a senior worker (hence the subscript BB  BS). We use this same notation for all thresholds that
follow. Thus, junior workers who locate in the big city and successfully complete a simple task sort
by ability when senior: those with high ability (α > αBBBS) stay in B, while those with low ability
(α 6 αBBBS) relocate to S. Ability matters in the location choice of senior workers because they
are willing to incur the high urban costs of the big city only in the hope of successfully completing
a complex project and, other things equal, this is more likely the higher their ability. The ability
threshold αBBBS is higher (fewer senior workers locate in B) the higher the urban cost gap between
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B and S (∆γ), the lower the difference in opportunities to engage in a complex task (∆Ω), the lower
the value of experience acquired as a successful junior worker in the big city (eB), and the lower
the extra return from completing a complex task (pi2).
Consider a worker who instead locates in S when junior. She prefers to relocate to B when
senior (conditional of earlier success) if and only if
USB(α)−USS(α) = α [α(ΩB −ΩS)eS pi2 − (γB − γS)] > 0 , (6)
or, equivalently, if and only if
α > αSBSS ≡ ∆γeS pi2 ∆Ω . (7)
Thus, junior workers who locate in the small city and successfully complete a simple task also sort
by ability when senior: those with high ability (α > αSBSS) relocate to B, while those with low
ability (α 6 αSBSS) stay in S. The comparative statics for this threshold αSBSS are the same as for
αBBBS except that, since we are now looking at the senior period decision of a worker who located
in S in her junior period, it is eS rather than eB that appears in the threshold.
Note that the location choice as a junior worker affects the ability threshold above which a senior
worker prefers to locate in the big city. A successful junior worker who locates in B acquires more
valuable experience than one who locates in S (eB > eS), so has a lower ability threshold above
which location in B when senior is worthwhile:
αBBBS ≡ ∆γeB pi2 ∆Ω <
∆γ
eS pi2 ∆Ω
≡ αSBSS . (8)
Note also that the probability of not completing a simple task 1 − α falls with ability but is
nevertheless positive for everyone. Thus, even some very high-ability junior workers fail and
locate in the small city in their senior period. This is a first reason why sorting by ability will
always be imperfect: ability is important but luck also plays a role.7
Gathering all of the above, location decisions in the senior period follow the rules in the follow-
ing Lemma.
Lemma 1. A worker who fails at the simple task when junior, locates in S when senior.
A worker with α 6 αBBBS locates in S when senior.
A worker with αBBBS < α 6 αSBSS locates in B when senior if and only if she located in B
when junior and succeeded at the simple task.
A worker with αSBSS < α locates in B when senior unless she fails at the simple task when
junior.
Junior period location when self-confidence accurately reflects ability
Having characterized the senior period location choice conditional on junior period location and
success or failure at a simple task, we now turn to the junior period location choice. We begin with
a simple case in which an individual’s self-confidence while junior accurately reflects her ability
(σ = α). Afterwards, we will examine the more general case where an individuals’ self- confidence
7In the model of Behrens, Duranton, and Robert-Nicoud (2014) luck also prevents complete sorting.
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while junior may not reflect her actual ability (σ 6= α); only after working in a first task does a
worker learn her actual ability.
In Lemma 1 we have shown that senior-period location depends on the value of ability relative
to two thresholds, αBBBS and αSBSS, where αBBBS < αSBSS. Thus, in studying junior-period
location, we will need to consider three ranges of ability: α 6 αBBBS, αBBBS < α 6 αSBSS, and
αSBSS < α.
For a worker with low ability α 6 αBBBS locating in B when senior is never worthwhile
regardless of her junior period location. However, even knowing she will locate in S when senior,
such a worker may nevertheless locate in B when junior to acquire more valuable experience. In
particular, she locates in B in her junior period if and only if
UBS(α)−USS(α) = α2ΩS(eB − eS)pi2 − (γB − γS) > 0 , (9)
or, equivalently, if and only if
α > αBSSS ≡
√
∆γ
ΩS pi2 ∆e
, (10)
where
∆e ≡ eB − eS . (11)
Ability matters in the location choice of junior workers for two reasons (hence the exponent of α
in equation 9 and the square root in equation 10). First, because more able workers are more likely
to complete a simple task and attain experience, which is more valuable if acquired in the big city.
Second, because that experience helps complete a complex task once the worker reaches her senior
period and success at that is also more likely the greater her ability. A worker with α 6 αBBBS,
who always locates in S when senior, may be willing to incur the higher urban costs of B when
junior in order to acquire additional experience, which could be valuable if an opportunity to use
that experience in S when senior were to arise. The ability threshold αBSSS above which location
in B when junior is worthwhile for such a worker is higher (fewer junior workers locate in B) the
higher the urban cost gap between B and S, ∆γ, the lower the difference in the experience acquired
by successful junior workers in B and S, ∆e, the smaller the opportunities to engage in a complex
task as a senior worker in the small city, ΩS, and the lower the extra return from completing a
complex task, pi2. Note that these comparative statics are the same as for the ability thresholds
that determine the location of senior workers, except that in the junior period it is the difference in
experience, ∆e, instead of the difference in opportunities, ∆Ω, that matters.
For a worker with αBBBS < α 6 αSBSS locating in B when senior is worthwhile if she located
in B when junior and successfully completed her simple task. Knowing this, she locates in B in her
junior period if and only if
UBB(α)−USS(α) = α2(ΩB eB −ΩS eS)pi2 − (1+ α)(γB − γS) > 0 , (12)
or, equivalently, if and only if
α > αBBSS ≡ 12
(
α˜+
√
α˜2 + 4 α˜
)
, where α˜ ≡ ∆γ
(ΩBeB −ΩSeS)pi2 . (13)
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Note that the more complex functional form for this threshold αBBSS occurs because for workers
with intermediate ability (αBBBS < α 6 αSBSS) their junior period location affects their senior
period location. Thus, in the utility comparison of equation (12) there is a difference in urban
costs both for the junior period and, conditional on success, also for the senior period. In contrast,
workers with low ability (α < αBBBS) chose their junior period location knowing they will locate
in S when senior regardless. The comparative statics on this threshold αBBSS are nevertheless the
same as for the threshold αBSSS, except that for workers with intermediate ability the differences
in opportunities combine with the differences in experience to determine junior location.
For a worker with high ability αSBSS < α locating in B when senior (conditional on junior
period success) is always worthwhile regardless of her junior period location. Knowing she will
locate in B when senior if successful, she locates in B in her junior period if and only if
UBB(α)−USB(α) = α2ΩB(eB − eS)pi2 − (γB − γS) > 0 , (14)
or, equivalently, if and only if
α > αBBSB ≡
√
∆γ
ΩB pi2 ∆e
. (15)
The comparative statics for this threshold αBBSB are the same as for αBSSS except that, since we
are now looking at the junior period decision of a worker who will locate in B instead of in S when
senior, it is ΩB rather than ΩS that appears in the threshold.
Gathering all of the above, location decisions in the two periods follow the rules in the following
Lemma.
Lemma 2. A worker who fails at the simple task when junior, locates in S when senior.
A worker with α 6 αBBBS locates in S when senior; if α 6 αBSSS she also locates in S when
junior while if instead αBSSS < α she locates in B when junior.
A worker with αBBBS < α 6 αSBSS locates in S in both periods if α 6 αBBSS; if instead
αBBSS < α, she locates in B when junior and, if she succeeds at the simple task, also locates in B
when senior.
A worker with αSBSS < α locates in B when senior unless she fails at the simple task when
junior; if αBBSB < α she also locates in B when junior while if instead α 6 αBBSB she locates in S
when junior.
With this, we now have all the information required to characterize location as a function of
ability when workers’ self-confidence while junior accurately reflects their ability (σ = α).
Equilibrium location when self-confidence accurately reflects ability
At first glance the positive interaction between workers’ ability and the more valuable experience
and greater opportunities that the big city provides would suggest a straightforward ‘assortative
matching’ result with low-ability workers locating in S both periods and high-ability workers
locating in B both periods, with the exception of those high-ability workers who, having failed
at the simple task in B when junior, move to S when senior. The previous lemmas, however, hint
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at additional relocation trajectories. For instance, workers may decide to locate in S when junior
to save on urban costs but then, if they are successful and acquire some experience, relocate to B
when senior to take advantage of greater opportunities to put that experience to use. Alternatively,
workers may decide to gain additional experience by locating in B when junior but then, even
if they have been successful, relocate to S when senior and use their big-city experience there
thus saving on urban costs. The existence of these trajectories clearly depends on whether the
differences in experience or in opportunities between S and B dominate the tradeoffs that workers
face given their ability.
The following proposition characterizes the exact conditions under which relocations may or
may not take place in equilibrium.
Proposition 1. When workers’ self-confidence while junior accurately reflects their ability (σ = α),
location and relocation patterns fall in one of three cases.
Case 1. If ∆e
∆Ω2
< pi2 eS
2
ΩB ∆γ
:
• Workers with α 6 αSBSS locate in S in both periods.
• Workers with αSBSS < α 6 αBBSB locate in S when junior and, if and only if
successful, relocate to B when senior.
• Workers with αBBSB < α locate in B in both periods unless they fail at the simple
task when junior, in which case they relocate to S when senior.
Case 2. If pi2 eS
2
ΩB ∆γ
6 ∆e
∆Ω2
6 pi2 eB2ΩS ∆γ :
• Workers with α 6 max(αBBBS, min(αSBSS, αBBSS)) locate in S in both periods.
• Workers with max(αBBBS, min(αSBSS, αBBSS)) < α locate in B in both periods
unless they fail at the simple task when junior, in which case they relocate to S when
senior.
Case 3. If pi2 eB
2
ΩS ∆γ
< ∆e
∆Ω2
:
• Workers with α 6 αBSSS locate in S in both periods.
• Workers with αBSSS < α 6 αBBBS locate in B when junior and relocate to S when
senior.
• Workers with αBBBS < α locate in B in both periods unless they fail at the simple
task when junior, in which case they relocate to S when senior.
Proof See appendix A.
Intuitively, in all three cases described by the proposition, workers with high ability locate in
B in both periods (provided they are successful at the simple task when junior) whereas workers
with low ability locate in S in both periods. This is explained by the positive interaction between
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workers’ ability and the more valuable experience and opportunities provided by B. What differs
across cases is, instead, the location of workers with intermediate ability.
In case 1, the difference between B and S in the value of experience acquired when junior is
dwarfed by the difference in opportunities to use that experience when senior. Restated in terms
of parameters, ∆e is small relative to ∆Ω. This makes it worthwhile for workers of intermediate
ability to locate in S when junior and in B when senior if successful at the simple task when junior.
In this way, they avoid the higher urban costs of B when junior that, due to their moderate ability,
is not compensated by a higher enough expected benefit in terms of differential experience. And
yet, they relocate to B when senior since this provides sufficiently larger expected opportunities to
offset the higher urban costs of B when senior.
In case 3, the situation is reversed: the difference between B and S in the value of experience
acquired when junior dwarfs the difference in opportunities to use that experience when senior.
Restated in terms of parameters, ∆e is large relative to ∆Ω. This makes it worthwhile for workers
of intermediate ability to locate in B when junior and in S when senior no matter whether they
are successful or not at the simple task when junior. In this way they enjoy the more valuable
experience associated with working in B when junior but avoid a higher urban cost when senior
that, due to their moderate ability, is not compensated by a higher enough benefit in terms of
differential opportunities.
In the intermediate case 2 neither the greater experience nor the greater opportunities of B
dominate and changing location is not worthwhile irrespective of ability, even for workers who
succeed at completing the first simple task when junior.
The three cases are respectively described in panels (a), (b) and (c) of figure 1 along the 45-degree
line. The diagram in each panel represents self-confidence (σ) on the horizontal axis and ability (α)
on the vertical axis. Proposition 1 concerns the case where self-confidence accurately reflects ability
(σ = α), which corresponds to the diagonal. For instance, in panel (a) (for case 1) the segment of
the diagonal in the bottom-left of the diagram (α 6 αSBSS) lies in an area marked SS, meaning
that workers with low ability locate in S in both periods; the intermediate segment of the diagonal
(αSBSS < α 6 αBBSB) lies in an area marked SB, meaning that workers with intermediate ability
locate in S when junior and, if successful, relocate to B when senior; the top-right segment of the
diagonal (αBBSB < α) lies in an area marked BB, meaning that workers with high ability locate
in B in both periods unless they fail at the simple task when junior, in which case they relocate to
S when senior. The area off the diagonal corresponds to cases where a worker’s self-confidence
when junior may not accurately reflect her actual ability, to which we turn next.
Equilibrium location when self-confidence does not reflect ability accurately
We now consider the situation in which a worker’s self-confidence when junior may not accurately
reflect her actual ability (σ 6= α). Only after trying to complete a simple task for the first time
does a worker realize her actual ability. To remain as general as possible, we do not make any
specific assumption on the correlation between self-confidence and ability, characterizing instead
the equilibrium location of workers for all possible combinations of σ and α.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium location choices by self-confidence and ability
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When self-confidence in the junior period does not accurately reflect a worker’s ability, both
junior and senior location decisions change. The junior decision is still driven by the same tradeoffs
as before but it is now based on the individual’s self-confidence σ (i.e., her prior about her ability)
rather than her ability α. The senior decision is also affected. While α is known to the senior worker,
her junior period decision affects her experience, which in turn affects the relative incentives to
locate in B or S when senior.
The main implication is that workers whose self-confidence is very different from their ability
may end up making decisions they would not have made if they had known their actual ability to
start with. The resulting patterns of self-deceit are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. When workers’ self-confidence while junior does not reflect ability accurately (σ 6=
α), location and relocation patterns fall in one of three cases.
Case 1. If ∆e
∆Ω2
< pi2 eS
2
ΩB ∆γ
:
• During their junior period
– Workers with σ 6 αBBSB locate in S.
– Workers with αBBSB < σ locate in B.
• During their senior period
– Workers with α 6 αBBBS locate in S.
– Workers with αBBBS < α 6 αSBSS locate in B if αBBSB < σ and they succeed
at the simple task when junior; they locate in S otherwise.
– Workers with αSBSS < α locate in B if they succeed at the simple task when
junior; they locate in S otherwise.
Case 2. If pi2 eS
2
ΩB ∆γ
6 ∆e
∆Ω2
6 pi2 eB2ΩS ∆γ :
• During their junior period
– Workers with σ 6 max(αBBBS, min(αSBSS,αBBSS)) locate in S.
– Workers with max(αBBBS, min(αSBSS,αBBSS)) < σ locate in B.
• During their senior period
– Workers with α 6 αBBBS locate in S.
– Workers with αBBBS < α 6 αSBSS locate in B if they succeed at the simple
task when junior and max(αBBBS, min(αSBSS,αBBSS)) < σ; they locate in S
otherwise.
– Workers with αSBSS < α locate in B if they succeed at the simple task when
junior; they locate in S otherwise.
Case 3. If pi2 eB
2
ΩS ∆γ
< ∆e
∆Ω2
:
• During their junior period
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– Workers with σ 6 αBSSS locate in S.
– Workers with αBSSS < σ locate in B.
• During their senior period
– Workers with α 6 αBBBS locate in S.
– Workers with αBBBS < α 6 αSBSS locate in B if αBSSS < σ and they succeed
at the simple task when junior; they locate in S otherwise.
– Workers with αSBSS < α locate in B if they succeed at the simple task when
junior; they locate in S otherwise.
Proof Location decisions when junior follow directly from Proposition 1, but with ability α re-
placed by self-confidence σ.
Locations decisions when senior depend on the value of α relative to the thresholds αBBBS and
αSBSS.
Starting from the lowest ability, consider first workers with α 6 αBBBS. By Lemma 1, such
workers always locate in S when senior.
Consider next workers with αBBBS < α 6 αSBSS. By Lemma 1, workers with αBBBS < α 6
αSBSS locate in B when senior if and only if they locate in B when junior and succeed at the simple
task. We now need to distinguish the same three cases as in Proposition 1. In case 1, by Proposition
1 (with α replaced by σ), workers with αBBBS < α 6 αSBSS locate in B when junior (and thus also
when senior if successful at the simple task) if and only if αBBSB < σ. In case 2, by Proposition 1
(with α replaced by σ), workers with αBBBS < α 6 αSBSS locate in B when junior (and thus also
when senior if successful at the simple task) if and only if max(αBBBS, min(αSBSS, αBBSS)) < σ.
In case 3, by Proposition 1 (with α replaced by σ), workers with αBBBS < α 6 αSBSS locate in B
when junior (and thus also when senior if successful at the simple task) if and only if αBSSS < σ.
Turning finally to workers with αSBSS < α, by Lemma 1, such workers always locate in B when
senior if they succeed at the simple task when junior; they locate in S otherwise.
The three cases are again described in the three panels of figure 1, the focus being now on
the area away from the 45-degree line where self-confidence and ability do not coincide (σ 6= α).
The intuition behind the existence of these three cases is the same as before: in the first case the
difference in opportunities between B and S dominates; in the second case neither the difference
in experience nor the difference in opportunities prevails; in the third case it is the difference in
experience that dominates. The novelty is the presence of new trajectories that did not arise before
and correspond to the shaded areas in the three figures.
In panel (a) of figure 1, for case 1, where the difference in opportunities between B and S
dominates, most new trajectories arise for workers who locate in B when junior due to their
overconfidence (α < σ). Believing it is worthwhile for them to incur the higher cost of B, they
locate in B when junior while, had they accurately assessed their ability when young, they would
have located in S instead. What happens to them depends on how high their ability turns out to
be.
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A first group consists of overconfident workers with high-enough ability to locate in B when
senior no matter where they have completed the simple task when junior (αSBSS < α < αBBSB).
Their ability, however, would not be high enough to justify location in B when junior if correctly
assessed. Yet, their overconfidence brings them to B when junior and there they remain if they are
lucky enough to complete the simple task. These are the workers whose σ and α fall in the top
right shaded rectangle labelled BB.
A second group consists of workers with intermediate ability (αBBBS < α 6 αSBSS) who
also locate in B when junior due to overconfidence (and are lucky enough to gain experience eB).
These are the workers whose σ and α fall in the middle right shaded rectangle labelled BB. Going
horizontally from this rectangle to the diagonal, we see that these workers, had they accurately
assessed their ability when junior, would have located in S in both periods. However, given that
they located in B when junior driven by their overconfidence and gained some valuable experience,
and in light of their intermediate ability, now it is worthwhile for them to stay in B when senior.
A third group consists of workers who decide to locate in B when junior unaware of their very
low ability (α 6 αBBBS). Some of them are lucky: they succeed at the simple task and gain higher
experience eB. However, while completing the simple task, they realize that their ability is too low
to stand a good enough chance of exploiting higher opportunities ΩB by remaining in B, so they
relocate to S when senior. This holds for all workers whose σ and α fall in the bottom right shaded
rectangle labelled BS. Going horizontally from this rectangle to the diagonal, we see that these
workers, had they accurately assessed their ability when young, would have instead located in S
both periods.
In addition to the three new trajectories for overconfident workers, in panel (a) there is also one
new trajectory due to underconfident workers. Underconfident workers with very high ability
locate in S when junior and, if successful as junior, move to B when senior once they realize that
their ability is high enough to exploit better opportunities there. These are the workers whose σ
and α fall in the top left shaded rectangle labelled SB.
Panel (b) of figure 1 corresponds to case 2, where neither the difference in opportunities nor
the difference in the value of experience between B and S dominate. The inaccurate assessment
of ability when junior makes a difference for overconfident workers with low ability, who would
locate in both periods in S if correctly informed, and for underconfident workers with high ability,
who would locate in both periods in B if correctly informed.
Overconfident workers with very low ability locate in B when junior and, even if successful
as junior, relocate to S when senior once they realize that their ability is too low to benefit from
better opportunities in B. These are the workers whose σ and α fall in the bottom right shaded
rectangle labelled BS. Then there are other overconfident workers of higher ability who when
junior are brought to B by their overconfidence and are lucky enough to succeed at the simple
task. Thanks to the higher experience gained and their higher ability, it is beneficial for them to
stay in B also when senior. These are the workers whose σ and α fall in the middle right shaded
rectangle labelled BB.
Conversely, underconfident workers with very high ability locate in S when junior and, if
successful as junior, move to B when senior once they realize that their ability is high enough to
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exploit better opportunities there. These are the workers whose σ and α fall in the top left shaded
rectangle labelled SB.8
Panel (c) at the bottom of figure 1 corresponds to case 3, where the difference in the value of
experience between B and S dominates. In this case, most new trajectories are driven by workers
who locate in S when junior due to their underconfidence (σ < α). Believing it is not worthwhile
for them to incur the higher cost of B, they locate in S when junior while, had they accurately
assessed their ability when young, they would have located in B instead. What happens to them
depends on how high their ability turns out to be.
Underconfident workers with very high ability (αSBSS < α), as long as they succeed at com-
pleting the simple task when junior, find it worthwhile moving to B when senior. Thus, their senior
location is not affected, although, having gained less experience by locating in S when junior, they
are nevertheless less likely to succeed at the complex task than if they had located in B. These are
the workers whose σ and α fall in the top left shaded rectangle labelled SB.
For those among underconfident workers with intermediate ability (αBBBS < α 6 αSBSS)
locating in S when junior affects their senior location choice. Had they accurately assessed their
ability when young, they would have located both periods in B. Having instead located is S when
junior due to underconfidence, they gain less valuable experience even if successful and now do
not find it worthwhile to locate in B when senior given that the difference in opportunities between
B and S is limited. These are the workers whose σ and α fall in the higher of the two left shaded
rectangles labelled SS.
Underconfident workers with lower ability (αBSSS < α 6 αBBBS) would not have located in B
when senior regardless. Their underconfidence merely leads them to locate in S instead of B when
junior. These are the workers whose σ and α fall in the lower of the two left shaded rectangles
labelled SS.
Finally, some overconfident workers with very low ability (α 6 αBSSS < σ) follow the same
pattern as in case 1. Driven by their overconfidence, they locate in B when junior. Then, realizing
that their ability is too low, they move to S when senior even if successful at the simple task. Had
they correctly anticipated their low ability, they would have located in S both periods. This holds
for all workers whose σ and α fall in the bottom left shaded rectangle labelled BS.
4. Endogenizing urban structure
We now endogenize the urban structure and solve for the general equilibrium of our model.
Suppose each of the two cities B and S is linear and monocentric.9 Land covered by each city
is endogenously determined and can be represented by a segment on the positive real line. All
workers in a city perform their job at a single point x = 0, the Central Business District (cbd).
8The aspect of panel (b) will vary slightly depending on where αBBSS lies relative to αBBBS and αSBSS. The panel
is represented for αSBSS < αBBSS so that max(αBBBS, min(αSBSS,αBBSS)) = αSBSS, but conclusions are very
similar regardless. The only difference is that as we let αBBSS fall in value, a new shaded area marked SS appears in
the middle left while the shaded area marked BB in the middle right shrinks in size until it ends up disappearing.
9We develop a highly simplified version of the monocentric city model (Alonso, 1964, Mills, 1967, Muth, 1969). For
an exposition of more general versions of the monocentric city model, see Brueckner (1987) and Duranton and Puga
(2015).
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Workers consume housing and a freely tradable numéraire good. For simplicity, let us assume
that all residences have the same size, are built under perfect competition with a constant capital
to land ratio, and are owned by absentee landlords.10 Thus, every individual consumes one unit of
floorspace built on one unit of land with a fixed amount of capital. The price of capital is constant
throughout the economy while the price of land varies. Commuting costs increase linearly with
distance to the cbd, so that a worker living at distance x incurs a commuting cost τx. The total
urban costs for a worker located in a residence at a distance x from the cbd of city i are the sum of
her commuting costs τx and her housing costs Pi(x):
γi(x) = τx+ Pi(x) , i,j ∈ {B, S} . (16)
As a result, any resident in a city is willing to bid τx more for a house that is x closer to the
cbd.11 Equilibrium house prices are then such that the increase in commuting costs incurred as
one relocates towards the cbd is exactly offset by an increase in house prices.
Using Ni to denote the equilibrium population in city i, house prices in city i can then be
expressed as
Pi(x) = τ(Ni − x) + r¯ , i,j ∈ {B,S} , (17)
where the constant r¯ is the sum of the rental cost of the fixed amount of capital used in every
residence and the rental price of land in the best non-urban use (e.g., agriculture). A worker living
at the edge of a city has to commute a distance equal to the population of the city, thus incurring
a commuting cost τNi, but only pays r¯ for housing. A worker living at the cbd has no cost of
commuting but pays an additional τNi for her house. Substituting equation (17) into (16) yields
urban cost in city i:
γi = τNi + r¯ , i,j ∈ {B,S} . (18)
In order to allow for the coexistence of junior and senior workers in a city, let us assume that
there are overlapping generations of workers. Each generation is made up of a continuum of
workers of measure 1 and lives for two periods. Thus, workers coexist when junior with senior
workers of the previous generation and coexist when senior with junior workers of the next
generation. Since our focus is on the steady state, we avoid using a time subscript for our variables.
The total population of city i, Ni, is the sum of junior and senior workers in the city. Let us
denote by n the difference in population between the big and the small city:
n ≡ NB − NS . (19)
Note that 0 6 n 6 2 since, by definition, the big city has a larger population and since the total
population in the economy at any point in time is made up of two living generations with unit
population mass each. Combining equations (18) and (19), we can then express the difference in
urban costs between B and S, ∆γ ≡ γB − γS, as
∆γ = τn . (20)
10Having instead common ownership of the housing stock by local residents yields essentially the same results. One
simply gets γi = 12τNi instead of γi = τNi in equation (18) below.
11Note that the assumptions of homogenous commuting costs and fixed housing consumption imply a common
bid-rent schedule for all workers, allowing us to abstract from within-city sorting.
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Taking n as given, each worker can calculate∆γ as per equation (20). She can then substitute this
into equation (3) to calculate αBBBS, into (7) to calculate αSBSS, into (10) to calculate αBSSS, into
(13) to calculate αBBSS, and into (15) to calculate αBBSB. Given all these thresholds, each worker
chooses her optimal location as per proposition 2. If we then add up how many workers choose to
locate in each city, an equilibrium arises when this yields a difference in population between the
two cities equal to n.
Adding NB + NS = 2 to equation (19) and solving for NB, we can express population in B in
terms of n:
NB = 1+
n
2
. (21)
In equilibrium this must equal the total number of junior and senior workers choosing to reside in
B, which we will denote by b(n). To obtain an expression for b(n), we must refer back to propo-
sition 2. Proposition 2 distinguishes three cases depending on the value of ∆γ = τn. Expressing
the corresponding conditions in terms of n, case 1 arises for 0 6 n < n, where n ≡ pi2eS2∆Ω2τΩB∆e ; case
2 arises for n 6 n 6 n, where n ≡ pi2eB2∆Ω2τΩS∆e ; and case 3 arises for n < n 6 2. Let us denote by
f (σ, α) the probability density function for the bivariate distribution of ability and self-confidence
for individual workers in the population. Hence, we can write:
b(n) =

1∫
αBBSB(n)
1∫
0
f (σ, α)dαdσ+
1∫
αBBSB(n)
αSBSS(n)∫
αBBBS(n)
α f (σ, α)dαdσ+
1∫
0
1∫
αSBSS(n)
α f (σ, α)dαdσ if 0 6 n < n
1∫
αmax min(n)
1∫
0
f (σ, α)dαdσ+
1∫
αmax min(n)
αSBSS(n)∫
αBBBS(n)
α f (σ, α)dαdσ+
1∫
0
1∫
αSBSS(n)
α f (σ, α)dαdσ if n 6 n 6 n
1∫
αBSSS(n)
1∫
0
f (σ, α)dαdσ+
1∫
αBSSS(n)
αSBSS(n)∫
αBBBS(n)
α f (σ, α)dαdσ+
1∫
0
1∫
αSBSS(n)
α f (σ, α)dαdσ if n < n 6 2
(22)
with αmax min(n) ≡ max (αBBBS(n), min (αSBSS(n),αBBSS(n))).
Equation (22) can be readily understood by referring back to proposition 2. For example, the
first case (for 0 6 n < n) has three types of workers choosing lo locate in B (each type captured
by one of the three double integrals for this first case): junior workers with high self-confidence
αBBSB < σ; senior workers with intermediate ability αBBBS < α 6 αSBSS who in their junior
period located in B due to high-self-confidence αBBSB < σ and succeeded at the simple task
(probability α); and senior workers with high ability αSBSS < α, regardless of their self confidence,
provided they succeeded at the simple task when junior (probability α).
We can also interpret equation (22) in terms of figure 1. Given the unit population mass of each
generation of workers, the number of junior workers who decide to reside in B is given by the
fraction of them with self-confidence and ability in rectangles BB or BS. The number of senior
workers who decide to reside in B is given by the fraction of them with self-confidence and ability
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in rectangles BB or SB weighted by the probability α that they successfully completed the simple
task when junior.
Any equilibrium value of n has to satisfy b(n) = 1 + n2 for 0 6 n 6 2. Under the assumption
that f (σ,α) is continuous and differentiable in α ∈ [0,1] and σ ∈ [0,1], the following result holds.
Proposition 3. There exists a unique equilibrium allocation of population across cities. In equilib-
rium, both the big and small cities are populated. The difference n in population between the big
and small cities decreases with the common commuting cost per unit of distance τ, and increases
with the additional opportunities∆Ω and the additional experience∆e provided by the bigger city.
Proof See appendix B.
When deciding whether to locate in B, junior workers trade off the greater experience they
are likely to acquire by locating there against the higher urban costs they need to incur. Senior
workers trade off the greater opportunities B provides to use their previously-acquired experience
against its higher urban costs. In equilibrium, some workers strictly prefer to locate in B and others
strictly prefer to locate in S. Individual choices depend on self-confidence, ability and luck, all of
which vary across workers, on common parameters capturing the magnitude of the advantages
and disadvantages of locating in the big city, and on the choices of other workers.
In equilibrium, the difference in population n between B and S is such that the difference
between the mass of workers who prefer to locate in B and the mass of workers who prefer to
locate in S in light of that difference n aggregates up to precisely n. Off-equilibrium, the mass of
workers who given n prefer B to S may aggregate up to more than n, but as more workers locate
in B and fewer in S commuting and housing costs increase in B relative to S until an equilibrium
is restored. And conversely if the mass of workers who given n prefer B to S aggregates up to less
than n.
The higher the common cost of commuting per unit of distance, τ, the greater the difference
in urban costs for any given difference in population between B and S, and hence the smaller is
n in equilibrium. The greater the additional opportunities ∆Ω and the additional experience ∆e
provided by B, the greater its attractiveness relative to S so a higher difference in population n
(which results in a higher difference in urban costs) is needed to balance things out in equilibrium.
5. Data
We use panel data from the “cross-sectional sample” of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
1979 (nlsy79). The survey, conducted by the us Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics,
follows a nationally representative sample of 6,111 men and women who were 14–22 years old
when they were first surveyed in 1979. These individuals were interviewed annually through 1994
and are currently interviewed on a biennial basis. The nlsy79 contains information on a rich set of
personal characteristics and tracks individuals’ labour market activities.
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Locations
The confidential geocoded portion of the nlsy79 gathers information on the location of each
respondent at multiple points in time. Specifically, for each respondent we know the county and
state where they are located at birth, at age 14, and at each interview date since 1979. We use this
location information to link the counties of location of each respondent to Core Based Statistical
Areas (cbsa) as defined in 2008. A cbsa or metropolitan area is a collection of counties that delimits
a local labour market.12 We classify individuals as located in a big city if they are within a cbsa with
a population over two million in 2010. By this definition, 44 cbsa metropolitan areas are classified
as big (from Kansas City with a population of just over 2 million to New York with almost 19
million). This is in line with other papers dealing with urban sorting, which typically classify cities
as big when their population is above a threshold of between 1.5 million (Baum-Snow and Pavan,
2012) and 2.5 million (Eeckhout, Pinheiro, and Schmidheiny, 2014). Our results are very similar
using these alternative definitions.
Ability
Importantly for us, the nlsy79 contains test results that aim to capture cognitive ability as well
as self-evaluation. Our basic measure of ability is the individual’s percentile score in the Armed
Forces Qualification Test (afqt), a cognitive ability test that was administered to nlsy79 respon-
dents in 1980, when their median age was 19.
For some additional results, we also construct an alternative measure of skills following Eeck-
hout, Pinheiro, and Schmidheiny (2014). They argue that, in a spatial equilibrium model with
worker mobility and Cobb-Douglas preferences, any differences in real wages across individu-
als reflect differences in their skills. To construct this price-theoretic measure of skills, we first
identify the last wave in nlsy79 where an individual reports a wage, which corresponds to 2010
for the majority of the sample. Davis and Ortalo-Magné (2011) show that in the United States
housing expenditure shares are, to a large extent, constant across metropolitan areas despite large
differences in average income levels (hence the Cobb-Douglas assumption). Thus, like Eeckhout,
Pinheiro, and Schmidheiny (2014), we adjust nominal wages for housing cost differences across
cities using the median housing expenditure share of 0.24. Housing costs are measured through
mean rental price indices for the individual’s metropolitan areas of residence, calculated from the
2009 American Community Survey.13 If w is the individual’s log nominal wage and h the log
rental price index for the individual’s metropolitan area of residence, the Eeckhout, Pinheiro, and
Schmidheiny (2014) price-theoretic measure of skills is w− 0.24 h.
The moderate correlation between the two measures of ability we use, 0.42, suggests that they
capture different dimensions of skills. While the afqt score approximates cognitive ability, the
12Core Based Statistical Areas (cbsa) are defined by the Office of Management and Budget. These cbsa metropolitan
areas have replaced the metropolitan areas that were defined based on the 1990 census.
13Most workers report a wage in 2010 (72%). For the small share of workers who report their last wage in the 2008
wave (9%), we also use 2009 metropolitan area rental price indices to construct their measure of skills. For workers
who report their last wage in 2004 or 2006 (7%), we calculate rental price indices using data from the 2005 American
Community Survey. Last, for workers who report their last wage in 1998, 2000 or 2002 (12%), we calculate rental price
indices using data from the 2000 Decennial Census.
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Eeckhout, Pinheiro, and Schmidheiny (2014) price-theoretic measure of skills reflects not just
cognitive ability but also other traits that may be valuable in the job market and, importantly,
the consequences of earlier individual decisions, including location, training and job choices.
Self-confidence
In our model, we use the term self-confidence to refer to individuals’ perception of their own abil-
ity. Psychologists often use the term ‘general self-efficacy’ to capture this aspect of self-evaluation.
This is defined as “individuals’ perception of their ability to perform across a variety of different
situations” (Judge, Erez, and Bono, 1998, p. 170). While the nlsy79 does not measure general
self-efficacy per se, it does measure self-esteem, which is strongly related to it. Self-esteem is
defined as “the overall value one places on oneself as a person” (Harter, 1990, p. 67). Conceptu-
ally, general self-efficacy and self-esteem are somewhat different aspects of self-evaluation in that
self-esteem is a broader concept. However, there is a very strong empirical association between
them. Respondents of the nlsy79 were subject in 1980 to a test to measure their self-esteem using
Rosenberg’s (1965) self-esteem scale. Summarising extant results on the relationship between
Rosenberg’s measure and general self-efficacy, Chen, Gully, and Eden (2001, p. 67) note that
“the standard general self-efficacy scale is correlated highly with the Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem
scale (r = .75 to .91)” and conclude that general self-efficacy “does not capture a construct distinct
from self-esteem.” Judge, Erez, and Bono (1998) argue that both concepts are strongly related to
individuals’ assessment of their own ability to perform on the job.
The Rosenberg (1965) measure is based on a ten-item questionnaire that assesses the self-
evaluation of respondents through their expressed agreement or disagreement with various state-
ments (e.g., “I am able to do things as well as most other people”). Five of the items have
positively-worded statements and are assigned a score between 0 and 3 based on increasing
agreement with the statement (strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree). Five of the
items have negatively-worded statements and are assigned a score between 0 and 3 based on
increasing disagreement with the statement. The Rosenberg measure is calculated by adding
up the scores for all ten items. We convert the measure into a percentile score and use that as
our measure of self-confidence. For us, it is important that this measure predates labour market
experience since labour market outcomes could feed back into self-confidence (see the discussion
in section 8 of Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz, 2011). It is also worth noting that
respondents were subject to the Rosenberg test before they were given their results on the afqt
test of cognitive ability. The low correlation between the afqt and Rosenberg scores, 0.3, reflects
the pervasiveness of flawed self-evaluation and is in line with that reported in psychology studies
such as the aforementioned Hansford and Hattie (1982).
Periods
To test the implications of our model, we need to define two periods (junior and senior) and relate
respondents’ location trajectories to their levels of ability and self-confidence. To match our model,
we would like to use as the junior period for each individual the time immediately prior to entering
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the labour market and to use as the senior period a time that is late enough that he or she has
accumulated significant labour market experience.
The nlsy79 records detailed information on the educational attainment of respondents over
time, so that in each wave, we know their highest grade completed and their schooling enrolment
status. We set the junior period for all respondents at the year after the highest level of education
is completed.14 The median age of individuals in their junior period is 20 for individuals with
no post-secondary education and 23 for individuals with post-secondary education. We then
determine whether each individual was located in a big metropolitan area or not in this junior
period.
Next, we set the senior period for all respondents by adding ten years to their junior period.
The median age of individuals in their senior period is 30 for individuals with no post-secondary
education and 33 for individuals with post-secondary education. Again, we determine whether
each individual was located in a big metropolitan area or not in this senior period.
Our starting sample is made of 6,111 individuals. We exclude individuals for whom the afqt
or the Rosenberg self-esteem scores are missing, which reduces the sample to 5,622 individuals.
We are able to determine the junior period location of 5,413 individuals. Availability of the
demographic controls we use further reduces our sample to 5,255.15
6. Empirical evidence
Observed location choices by self-confidence and ability
We begin by examining how the location choices of individuals in their junior and senior peri-
ods vary with self-confidence and ability. To better illustrate location choices graphically and
to relate these choices to the theoretical predictions depicted in figure 1, we first divide both
the self-confidence and the ability measures into terciles. This yields nine possible combina-
tions of self-confidence and ability. Figure 2 plots in a grid each of those nine combinations of
self-confidence and ability, with self-confidence on the horizontal axis and ability on the vertical
axis. If individuals chose a location strategy independently of their ability and self-confidence,
the prevalence of each location strategy in each of these nine cells should be the same regardless
of ability and self-confidence. Instead, different location strategies turn out to be more or less
prevalent depending on the values of ability and self-confidence.16 In panel (a) of figure 2, using
14We exclude educational periods that take place after a spell of more than two years away from education. For
example, if an individual completes an undergraduate university degree, works for three or more years, and then goes
back to university to pursue postgraduate studies, we take the year after completing the undergraduate degree as this
individual’s junior period, not the year after completing the postgraduate degree. In addition, for individuals who
complete their highest level of education before turning 18, we use the year in which they turn 18 as their junior period.
We exclude individuals who are older than 30 when they complete their highest level of education without any gap.
15Since the nlsy79 became biennial after 1994, for some individuals there is no interview ten years after their junior
period and we must use the preceding or subsequent year.
16As usual when measuring localisation, the relevant benchmark is not a uniform distribution but the distribution that
would arise under random location choices (see e.g. Ellison and Glaeser, 1997, Duranton and Overman, 2005). Thus, we
measure the prevalence of each location trajectory relative to a random-location benchmark in which each individual
followed each location strategy with the same probability as the share of that strategy in the aggregate population
regardless of ability and self-confidence.
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Figure 2: Observed location choices by self-confidence and ability terciles
the same notation as in figure 1, we assign to each grid cell the most prevalent location trajectory
observed in the data for that combination of self-confidence and ability.
Looking first at the three cells along diagonal of figure 2 (representing individuals whose self-
confidence and ability are well aligned), we see that individuals with low and intermediate values
of both self-confidence and ability tend to locate in small cities when junior and to remain there.
Similarly, individuals with high values of both self-confidence and ability tend to locate in big cities
when junior and to remain there. This assortative matching between cities and workers with an
accurate self-assessment matches well with our theoretical predictions. Looking back at the three
cases in figure 1, we can see that while all three have SS at the bottom left corner and BB at the top
right corner, the complete coverage of the diagonal with SS and BB best matches case 2.
Turning to individuals whose self-assessment is less accurate, consider next individuals with
intermediate values of self-confidence but whose ability is not intermediate but either high or
low. It is worth noting that such combinations of self-confidence and ability are very common
in practice. In fact, in our data individuals in the middle tercile of self-confidence are almost
equally likely to be in the top, middle and bottom terciles of ability.17 Looking at figure 2, we
see that individuals with intermediate self-confidence and low ability (bottom middle cell) tend
to locate in small cities when junior and remain there. According to our model, by not having
high self-confidence these individuals choose to locate in a small city when junior and, if they
subsequently realize their ability is low, they have no reason to alter this initial location choice.
Individuals who instead have intermediate self-confidence and high ability (top middle cell) tend
17The percentage of individuals in each of the three cells in the middle tercile of self-confidence is 11.1% for those in
the top tercile of ability, 12.2% for those in the middle tercile of ability, and 11.6% for those in the bottom tercile of ability.
Not only are these percentiles similar, but they are also not far from the 11.1% that would correspond to a uniform
bivariate distribution of self-confidence and ability.
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to locate in small cities when junior but to then relocate to big cities. Our model suggests that,
finding that they unexpectedly have high ability, these individuals move away from small cities
where their under-confidence led them to locate initially. Thus, both these empirical outcomes
match well again with our theoretical predictions, particularly with cases 1 and 2.
The only two cells in figure 2 that do not match with panel (b) of figure 1 are those for opposite
terciles of self-confidence and ability. Individuals in the highest tercile of self-confidence and the
lowest tercile of ability tend to locate in big cities in both periods, as indicated by BB in the bottom
right cell of figure 2. In panel (b) of figure 1, this bottom right range is marked BS instead. And
yet this difference between the theoretical predictions and the empirical findings will disappear if
αBBBS ≡ ∆γeB pi2 ∆Ω is quite low, which will tend to increase the prevalence of BB relative to BS in
the bottom right part of the figure. Intuitively, this happens if eB and ∆Ω are quite large. Then,
workers with low ability who are driven to the big city when junior due to overconfidence and
get lucky in solving the simple task are able to accumulate significant experience eB. Despite their
low ability, given their valuable big city experience and the much greater opportunities that big
cities provide, ∆Ω, they choose to remain there. Our regression results below provide additional
support for this interpretation.
Individuals in the lowest tercile of self-confidence and the highest tercile of ability tend to locate
in small cities in both periods, as indicated by SS in the top left cell of figure 2. In panel (b)
of figure 1, this range is marked SB instead. This empirical outcome is not as easy to reconcile
with the model. One possible explanation is that, while in the model junior workers only make
a location decision based on self-confidence, in practice they make additional decisions. For
instance, workers who have very little confidence in their ability, in addition to locating in a small
city, may engage in less training, not work as hard, etc. If they then realize their ability is much
higher than they thought, it may be too late to make up for the lack of investment in building
up their capabilities when junior, and they end up staying in the small city when senior even if
they are very able. A second explanation is that data for this range are quite noisy. Workers with
self-confidence in the lowest tercile and ability in the highest tercile are relatively uncommon and
tend to have a different type of low self-confidence: they tend to be simultaneously aware of their
abilities and quite critical of themselves (Kohn and Schooler, 1969, Rosenberg, Schooler, Schoen-
bach, and Rosenberg, 1995). Kohn and Schooler (1969) suggest taking answers to a subset of the
questions used to compute Rosenberg’s self-esteem measure as a way to separate self-confidence
from self-deprecation in such cases. When we replace the measure of self-confidence with this
alternative measure, the dominant strategy in this top left cell in figure 2 switches to SB as in the
theoretical predictions of panel (b) of figure 1 while all other cells remain unchanged. However,
we still do not wish to put much emphasis on this result, since the alternative measure, being
computed out of fewer questions, has much less variability and there are few individuals in this
range in any case.
Panel (a) of figure 2 only shows the most prevalent location choice in each of the nine cells
combining self-confidence and ability terciles. In panel (b) we provide a richer description of the
data by showing, in addition to the prevalent location choice, the incidence of every choice in each
cell. Each of the nine cells is now split into four quadrants corresponding to each possible two-
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period location strategy (SS in the bottom left, SB in the bottom right, BS in the top left, and BB in
the top right) with darker shades representing a higher frequency of that strategy compared to the
overall population. The prevalent location choice in each of the nine cells is marked in white over
the corresponding quadrant of that cell.18 We can then see that while BB is the prevalent location
strategy for the three cells on the right, corresponding to individuals in the highest tercile of self-
confidence, the prevalence of BB is stronger the higher the ability tercile, as would be expected.
Along the three top cells, corresponding to individuals in the highest tercile of ability, as we move
leftwards towards lower terciles of self-confidence, location strategy BB gradually loses ground to
SB and then this to SS. Note also that while, as noted above, SS is the dominant location strategy
in the top left cell, SB (the theoretical prediction in case 2, as shown in panel (b) of figure 1) is not
far. Strategy SS then becomes more clearly dominant for lower terciles of ability, again as would
be expected.
Overall, we find that the location choices of individuals in their junior and senior periods vary
with self-confidence and ability in a way that closely matches our theoretical predictions. However,
this is based on raw data without taking into account other characteristics and experiences of
individuals. We next turn to incorporating these.
Determinants of location in big and small cities
We now test key implications of our model by examining whether self-confidence and ability
affect the location decisions of individuals across cities of different sizes in their junior and senior
periods, while controlling for other drivers of location and mobility. Specifically, we estimate logit
models to look at the determinants of locating in a small or a big city either when junior or senior.
In table 1 we report exponentiated coefficients (odd ratios), so coefficients above one indicate a
positive effect and coefficients below one indicate a negative effect. Standard errors are clustered
at the metropolitan area level and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate that a coefficient is significantly different
from 1 (where 1 corresponds to an odds ratio implying no effect) at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
A first implication of our model is that junior workers sort on self-confidence instead of on
ability, so that we should expect more confident workers to have a higher probability of locating in
big cities initially. In column (1) of table 1 we estimate a logit model where the dependent variable
takes value one if the individual lives in a big city during his or her junior period, i.e. the year
after completing education. Results show that individuals with higher levels of self-confidence are
more likely to locate in a big city when junior. The corresponding coefficient on the self-confidence
percentile (statistically significantly different from 1 at the 1% level) reveals that an increase of one
standard deviation in the self-confidence percentile (28.6 points) raises the probability of locating
in a big city by 13%. Instead, individuals with higher levels of ability are not any more likely to
locate initially in a big city.
We include a set of conventional demographic controls. Results reveal that having college
education increases the probability of locating in a big city when junior by 123% (calculated by
subtracting 1 from the estimated coefficient 2.23) relative to having at most primary education
18We are grateful to Jesse Shapiro for suggesting this second panel.
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Table 1: Logit estimation of the determinants of location in big and small cities
Probability of For individuals For individuals
living in big city living in small city living in big city
upon completing upon completing upon completing
education education, education,
probability of probability of
having moved having moved
to big city to small city
10 years later 10 years later
(1) (2) (3)
Self-confidence percentile 1.004 1.002 0.997
(0.002)∗∗∗ (0.002) (0.002)
Cognitive ability percentile 1.000 1.007 0.999
(0.002) (0.003)∗∗ (0.003)
Male 0.943 0.943 1.061
(0.081) (0.098) (0.151)
Hispanic 2.007 1.582 0.449
(0.722)∗ (0.763) (0.171)∗∗
Black 1.313 1.162 0.456
(0.340) (0.350) (0.150)∗∗
High-school graduate 0.937 0.932 0.807
(0.137) (0.202) (0.196)
Some college 0.988 1.605 0.849
(0.167) (0.417)∗ (0.223)
College graduate 2.233 2.214 0.986
(0.549)∗∗∗ (0.595)∗∗∗ (0.286)
Never married 1.983 0.972 0.698
(0.431)∗∗∗ (0.180) (0.150)∗
Number of children 0.973 0.857 1.131
(0.032) (0.055)∗∗ (0.071)∗∗
Working spouse 1.386 0.768 1.178
(0.288) (0.096)∗∗ (0.209)
Living in small city at age 14 0.018 0.271 3.120
(0.004)∗∗∗ (0.066)∗∗∗ (0.739)∗∗∗
% working life unemployed 1.007 1.029
(0.010) (0.010)∗∗∗
Relative wage 1.180 0.804
(0.147) (0.145)
N 5,255 2,908 1,796
Pseudo R2 0.462 0.081 0.073
Notes: Odd ratios (exponentiated coefficients) are reported, with coefficients above one indicating a positive effect and
coefficients below one indicating a negative effect. All specifications include a constant and birth-year indicators.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the metropolitan area level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the
1, 5, and 10 percent levels. A ‘big city’ is defined as a Core Based Statistical Area (cbsa) with a population greater than
2,000,000 in 2010. White, female, ever married and high-school dropouts are the omitted categories. Relative wage is
the actual pre-migration wage of the individual relative to the wage predicted for the same individual by a regression
including all the variables in column (1), plus experience in each city-size class and its square, firm tenure and its square,
and a city-size class fixed-effect.
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while having never married raises the probability by around 100%. Hispanics are also more likely
to live in a big city during their junior period. Since many people are closely attached to the
place where they grew up, we include as a control an indicator variable that takes value one if the
individual was living in a small city at age 14. This turns out to be a crucial determinant of location
decisions, greatly decreasing the probability of locating in a big city upon completing education
and (as we shall see below) greatly increasing the probability of moving back home for those that
do locate in a big city when junior. However, our results regarding ability and self-confidence are
very similar whether we control for location at age 14 or not.
Turning to the senior period, our model implies that ability—revealed after some years of labour
market experience—should matter more for the location of senior workers, although sorting on
ability can still be quite imperfect. Moreover, some successful high-ability workers should relocate
from small to big cities while some unsuccessful low-ability workers should relocate from big to
small cities. To test these implications, we estimate two logit models in which the dependent
variable captures a relocation across cities of different sizes between the junior and senior periods.
In column (2) of table 1 we focus exclusively on workers who located in a small city upon
completing education (hence the smaller number of observations relative to column 1) and study
whether they move subsequently. The dependent variable takes value one if the individual has
relocated to a big city when observed in his or her senior period and value zero if the individual
remains in a small city. Therefore, we examine the determinants of relocating from a small to a
big city between periods. Results show that the level of self-confidence no longer influences the
decision to relocate while the level of ability is a crucial relocation driver from small to big cities.
The estimated coefficient implies that a one standard deviation increase in the ability percentile
(28.6 points) raises the probability of moving to a big city by 20%. Thus, ability matters for the
location of senior workers and, among the set of residents in small cities, it is the most able who
move to a big city when senior. Other determinants show that having children, a working spouse
or having lived in a small city at age 14 deter individuals located in a small city in their junior
period from moving to a big city in their senior period. On the contrary, those with post-secondary
education are more likely to make that move.
In column (3) of table 1 we focus exclusively on workers who located in a big city during their
junior period and study whether they move subsequently.19 The dependent variable takes value
one if the individual relocates to a small city when observed in his or her senior period and value
zero if the individual remains in a big city. Therefore, we examine the determinants of relocating
from a big to a small city between periods. Results reveal that neither self-confidence nor ability
are key determinants of the relocation decision of senior workers from big to small cities. This is
consistent with one of our conclusions from figure 2: if workers locate in a big city when junior
and are fortunate enough to have a positive experience there, they tend to stay even if their ability
is low.
Although low-ability workers who initially locate in big cities do not tend to relocate to small
19The number of observations in columns (2) and (3) add up to the number of workers for whom we observe their
senior period location, 4,704. This is lower than the number of observations in column (1) due to sample attrition over
the ten years that separates both periods.
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cities in general, results also reveal that such relocations from big to small cities can in part be
driven by a negative experience of the worker in a big city. This negative experience can be the
result of luck or the worker being unable to benefit from the larger set of opportunities in big
cities. We proxy these possibilities with two variables: the fraction of the time the individual spent
unemployed in the big city since his or her junior period, and the residual of his or her wage that
cannot be explained by observable wage determinants. Our findings show that the time spent
unemployed in a big city affects the likelihood of moving to a small city. The coefficient implies
that a one standard deviation increase in the share of time spent unemployed (8.1%) increases the
probability of moving to a small city by 23%. The coefficient on the relative wage (i.e., the wage
component that can not be explained by usual wage determinants) is not statistically significant.
Thus, our findings hint that unsuccessful workers in big cities tend to move to small cities, yet, they
are not necessarily the least able workers among the pool of workers in big cities. The coefficients
on the demographic controls show that blacks, Hispanics and individuals who remain unmarried
are less likely to move from a big to a small city when senior, while those who have more children
or grew up in a small city are more likely to move.
Robustness
We measure ability through individuals’ score in the afqt test. However, there is growing evidence
that ability is multi-dimensional and aspects beyond cognitive ability matter for labour market
outcomes (Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz, 2011). We have partly addressed this by
including wages relative to those of individuals with comparable observable characteristics when
looking at the probability of relocating (where these relative wages reflect some combination of
skills other than cognitive ability and also luck). As an additional robustness check, we re-estimate
our logistic regressions including the Eeckhout, Pinheiro, and Schmidheiny (2014) price-theoretic
measure of skills. Eeckhout, Pinheiro, and Schmidheiny (2014) argue that, in a spatial equilibrium
model with worker mobility and Cobb-Douglas preferences, any differences in real wages across
individuals reflect differences in their skills. As detailed in the data description of section 5, we
compute the measure of skills of Eeckhout, Pinheiro, and Schmidheiny (2014) by adjusting nominal
wages for housing cost differences across cities using the median housing expenditure share. This
ex-post measure of skills may help capture other dimensions of ability not measured by the afqt
score. However, note that it also reflects aspects of the job trajectory of individuals that impact their
final skills but are not necessarily related to ability, including luck and the individuals’ location
choices based on a-priori expectations.
Results when including the Eeckhout, Pinheiro, and Schmidheiny (2014) price-theoretic mea-
sure of skills (shown in table D.1 in appendix D) are essentially unchanged. For junior period
location decisions (column 1 in table D.1), individuals with higher self-confidence are significantly
more likely to locate in a big city, while cognitive ability is not statistically significant, just as in
our baseline results of table 1, column (1). The price-theoretic skill measure is not a statistically
significant determinant of location decisions in the junior period at the 10% level, although it is
close to being so. For senior period location decisions (column 2 in table D.1), both the ex-ante
cognitive skills measure and the ex-post price-theoretic measure of skills are statistically signifi-
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cant. Overall, the estimated coefficients in these two columns of table D.1 point in the direction
that high long-term skills are associated with having been initially in a big city and with not having
subsequently relocated to a small city.
A related concern is that our self-confidence measure may be capturing other relevant aspects of
personality. We have seen that, as predicted by our model, individuals with high self-confidence
are more likely to locate in a big city when young. However, high self-confidence may partly
reflect other personality traits that could make a person more predisposed towards living in a
big city. In particular, high self-confidence tends to be positively related to extraversion (Robins
et al., 2001). In turn, extravert individuals may be more likely to choose dense locations where
they will tend to be less socially isolated. This pattern, where those who locate in urban areas
as opposed to rural areas tend to be more extraverted, has been observed in some studies of the
location choices of doctors and clergy (Francis and Rutledge, 2004, Jones et al., 2013). Other studies,
however, argue that the relationship between extraversion and location preferences is not as clear-
cut, since big cities also favour anonymity which may help attract more introvert individuals. For
instance, Marshall (1970) finds that measures of introversion at the individual level are highly
correlated with a preference for privacy but not with a preference for solitude; and one of the
strongest correlates of a preference for privacy is the size of the city or town an individual lives in,
with more private individuals being significantly more likely to live in a bigger city. In any case,
we would like to check that the relationship between self-confidence and the probability of living
in a big city upon completing education is not driven by other personality traits correlated with
self-confidence. We thus re-estimate our logistic regressions including measures of personality
traits as additional controls.
Personality is most commonly assessed using a taxonomy of traits known as the big-five:
extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism and openness to experiences. Unfor-
tunately, the nlsy79 does not assess the big-five personality traits of its respondents. However,
a related panel data set, the nlsy79 Children and Young Adults, does. This is a separate survey
conducted to all offspring of nlsy79 female respondents. As part of this survey, young adults
were administered the Ten Item Personality Inventory (tipi) test, a ten-item questionnaire that
measures the big five personality traits. In addition they were also subject to the same Rosenberg
test that we use to measure self-confidence in our main sample. While nlsy79 Children and Young
Adults respondents were not subject to the afqt test that we use to measure cognitive ability
in our main sample, they were administered various other cognitive ability tests, in particular
the Peabody International Achievement Test (piat) for math, reading recognition and reading
comprehension. Given that the afqt combines four sections of the asvab test that measure math
knowledge, arithmetic reasoning, paragraph comprehension and word knowledge, we include in
our estimation the piat percentile scores for math, reading recognition and reading comprehension
as measures of cognitive ability in place of the afqt percentile score.
Since the nlsy79 Children and Young Adults follows offspring of women in our main data
set, individuals are much younger, which prevents us from performing a full replication of our
results with these data. In particular, the vast majority of respondents are too young to study
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the determinants of their location choices ten years after completing their education.20 Hence, we
cannot estimate the specifications for “senior” location choices in columns (2) and (3) of table 1.
We can, however, estimate the specification for “junior” location choices in column (1) of table
1. Results (reported in table D.1 in appendix D, column 4) still show self-confidence being a
significant determinant of the probability of locating in a big city upon completing education, even
after controlling for the big-five personality traits. There is a moderate positive correlation of 0.15
between the measure of extraversion and the measure of self-confidence. However, extraversion
does not significantly affect the probability of locating in a big city. Neither do the other personality
traits that are part of the big five, with the exception of conscientiousness. Other things equal, more
conscientious individuals (those with a tendency towards planned as opposed to spontaneous
behaviour) are less likely to locate in a big city when young.
7. Conclusions
Flawed self-assessment of own ability can help explain the limited sorting of workers across cities
of different sizes, even though bigger cities provide higher-ability workers with disproportionately
better learning experience and richer opportunities to exploit such experience. The reason is that
workers whose self-confidence at an early stage of their career is not aligned with their ability
may make location decisions they would not have made if they had known their actual ability
to start with. By the time they learn enough about their actual ability, those early decisions have
had a lasting impact, reducing their incentives to move and affecting their lifetime earnings. We
have formalized this argument using an overlapping generations model with sorting across cities
by workers who differ in self-confidence and ability, derived location and relocation patterns by
self-confidence and ability from the model, and shown that they are empirically relevant using data
for the United States. Besides helping explain limited urban sorting, these findings also confirm the
power of personality traits as predictors and as causes of economic success, even after controlling
for education, experience and cognition.
In particular, self-confidence is more important than actual ability for the location decisions of
young workers. For older workers, ability plays a stronger role in determining location, but the
lasting impact of their earlier choices limits the scope for relocation. Thus, some overconfident
young workers start their career in a big city, while they would have chosen a small one had
they correctly self-assessed their actual ability. If they nevertheless are fortunate enough to gain
valuable experience, they tend to find that they can fully exploit this only by remaining in the big
city also when older. Their initial misjudged decision thus becomes self-validating. Analogously,
some underconfident young workers end up spending their whole life in a small city, even though
a correct initial assessment of their ability would have made them self-select into a big city instead.
Workers who seriously underestimate their own ability may nevertheless relocate from a small to
a big city once their labour market experience provides them with better information of their true
capabilities. Relocations from big to small cities appear to be driven instead by lack of success in
20The median age of nlsy79 Children and Young Adults respondents in the most recent survey year is 26, compared
with a median age of 48 for nlsy79 respondents.
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the big city rather than by corrections to flawed self-assessment. Young workers who are confident
enough of their own abilities locate in bigger cities to pursue their dreams, but those dreams do
not come true for everyone.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
First, note that the three cases are mutually exclusive. Since eS < eB and ΩS < ΩB it follows
that pi2 eS
2
ΩB ∆γ
< pi2 eB
2
ΩS ∆γ
. Hence the condition for case 1, ∆e
∆Ω2
< pi2 eS
2
ΩB ∆γ
, and the condition for case 3,
pi2 eB2
ΩS ∆γ
< ∆e
∆Ω2
, cannot hold simultaneously. The condition for case 2, pi2 eS
2
ΩB ∆γ
6 ∆e
∆Ω2
6 pi2 eB2ΩS ∆γ , is
precisely that neither the condition for case 1 nor the condition for case 3 hold.
Case 1 arises when αSBSS < αBBSB. Substituting equations (7) and (15) into this inequality
and rearranging leads to the condition ∆e
∆Ω2
< pi2 eS
2
ΩB ∆γ
.
Starting from the lowest ability, consider first workers with α 6 αBBBS. By Lemma 2, such
workers always locate in S when senior, while they also locates in S when junior if and only if
α 6 αBSSS. Since eS < eB, it is always true that αBBBS < αSBSS so that α 6 αBBBS implies
α < αSBSS. The parameter condition defining case 1 is αSBSS < αBBSB. And since ΩS < ΩB, it
is always true that αBBSB < αBSSS. Thus, in case 1, α 6 αBBBS also implies α < αBSSS so that
workers with α 6 αBBBS locate in S both periods.
Consider next workers with αBBBS < α 6 αSBSS. The condition α 6 αSBSS is equivalent to
USB −USS 6 0. The parameter condition defining case 1 is αSBSS < αBBSB, so that α 6 αSBSS
also implies α < αBBSB, equivalent to UBB −USB < 0. Adding these two inequalities on utility
levels yields UBB − USS < 0, which is equivalent to α < αBBSS. By Lemma 2, workers with
αBBBS < α 6 αSBSS locate in S both periods if and only if α 6 αBBSS. Since in case 1 both
workers with α 6 αBBBS and workers with αBBBS < α 6 αSBSS locate in S both periods, we can
pool them together stating that workers with α 6 αSBSS locate in S in both periods.
Moving up to intermediate ability, consider workers with αSBSS < α 6 αBBSB. By Lemma 2,
workers with αSBSS < α locate in B when senior unless they fail at the simple task when junior,
while they locate in S when junior if and only if α 6 αBBSB. Thus, workers with αSBSS < α 6
αBBSB locate in S when junior and, if and only if successful, relocate to B when senior.
To conclude case 1, consider workers with αBBSB < α. The parameter condition defining case
1 is αSBSS < αBBSB, so that αBBSB < α also implies αSBSS < α. By Lemma 2, workers with
αSBSS < α locate in B when senior unless they fail at the simple task when junior, while they also
locate in B when junior if and only if αBBSB < α. Hence, workers with αBBSB < α locate in B in
both periods unless they fail at the simple task when junior, in which case they relocate to S when
senior.
Case 2 arises when αBBSB 6 αSBSS and αBBBS 6 αBSSS simultaneously. Substituting
equations (3), (7), (10) and (15) into this inequality and rearranging leads to the condition pi2 eS
2
ΩB ∆γ
6
∆e
∆Ω2
6 pi2 eB2ΩS ∆γ .
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Starting from the lowest ability, consider first workers with α 6 αBBBS. By Lemma 2, such
workers always locate in S when senior, while they also locates in S when junior if and only if
α 6 αBSSS. One of the parameter conditions for case 2 is αBBBS 6 αBSSS, so that α 6 αBBBS also
implies α 6 αBSSS. Thus, workers with α 6 αBBBS locate in S both periods.
Moving up to intermediate ability, consider workers with αBBBS < α 6 αSBSS. By Lemma 2,
if α 6 αBBSS such workers locate in S both periods, while if αBBSS < α, they locate in B in both
periods unless they fail at the simple task when junior; if they do fail, then they relocate to S when
senior. Thus, if αSBSS 6 αBBSS then all workers with αBBBS < α 6 αSBSS also have α 6 αBBSS
and locate in S in both periods. If αBBSS < αBBBS then all workers with αBBBS < α 6 αSBSS
also have αBBSS < α and locate in B in both periods unless they fail at the simple task when junior;
if they do fail, then they relocate to S when senior. If αBBBS 6 αBBSS < αSBSS then workers with
αBBBS < α 6 αSBSS fall in two subcategories: those with αBBBS < α 6 αBBSS locate in S in both
periods; while those with αBBSS < α < αSBSS locate in B in both periods unless they fail at the
simple task when junior, in which case they relocate to S when senior.
To conclude case 2, consider workers with αSBSS < α. By Lemma 2, such workers locate in
B when senior unless they fail at the simple task when junior, while they also locates in B when
junior if and only if αBBSB < α. One of the parameter conditions for case 2 is αBBSB 6 αSBSS, so
that αSBSS < α also implies αBBSB < α. Thus, workers with αSBSS < α locate in B both periods
unless they fail at the simple task when junior, in which case they relocate to S when senior.
Case 2 can be summarized based on the magnitude of αBBSS relative to αBBBS and αSBSS.
Workers with α 6 max(αBBBS, min(αSBSS, αBBSS)) locate in S in both periods. Workers with
max(αBBBS, min(αSBSS, αBBSS)) < α locate in B in both periods unless they fail at the simple
task when junior, in which case they relocate to S when senior.
Case 3 arises when αBSSS < αBBBS. Substituting equations (3) and (10) into this inequality
and rearranging leads to the condition pi2 eB
2
ΩS ∆γ
< ∆e
∆Ω2
.
Starting from the lowest ability, consider first workers with α 6 αBSSS. The parameter condi-
tion defining case 3 is αBSSS < αBBBS, so that α 6 αBSSS also implies α < αBBBS. By Lemma 2,
workers with α 6 αBBBS locate in S when senior, while they also locates in S when junior if and
only if α < αBSSS. Thus, in case 3, workers with α 6 αBSSS locate in S in both periods.
Moving up to intermediate ability, consider workers with αBSSS < α 6 αBBBS. By Lemma 2,
workers with α 6 αBBBS locate in S when senior, while they locate in B when junior if and only
if αBSSS < α. Thus, workers with αBSSS < α 6 αBBBS locate in B when junior and relocate to S
when senior.
Consider next workers with αBBBS < α 6 αSBSS. The condition αBBBS < α is equivalent to
UBB −UBS > 0. The parameter condition defining case 3 is αBSSS < αBBBS, so that αBBBS < α
also implies αBSSS < α, equivalent to UBS −USS > 0. Adding these two inequalities on utility
levels yields UBB − USS > 0, which is equivalent to αBBSS < α. By Lemma 2, workers with
αBBBS < α 6 αSBSS locate in B both periods if αBBSS < α, unless they fail at the simple task
when junior, in which case they relocate to S when senior.
To conclude case 3, consider workers with αSBSS < α. By Lemma 2, such workers locate in B
when senior unless they fail at the simple task when junior, in which case they locate in S when
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senior. Also by Lemma 2, such workers locate in B when junior if and only if αBBSB < α. Since
eS < eB, it is always the case that αBBBS < αSBSS so that αSBSS < α implies αBBBS < α. The
parameter condition defining case 3 is αBSSS < αBBBS. Since ΩS < ΩB, it is always the case
that αBBSB < αBSSS. Thus, in case 3, αSBSS < α also implies αBBSB < α, so that workers with
αSBSS < α locate in B both periods if αBBSS < α, unless they fail at the simple task when junior, in
which case they relocate to S when senior. Since in case 3 both workers with αBBBS < α 6 αSBSS
and workers with αSBSS < α choose the same locations, we can pool them together stating that
workers with αBBBS < α locate in B in both periods unless they fail at the simple task when junior,
in which case they relocate to S when senior.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 3
Define the auxiliary function
b˜(n) = 1+
n
2
− b(n) . (b.1)
This is the difference between the population of B, 1+ n2 , and the number of workers who wish to
locate in B given that population, b(n). Existence and uniqueness of the urban equilibrium can be
proven by showing that b˜(n) has a single root in the feasible interval 0 6 n 6 2.
We begin by showing that b(n) is a continuous decreasing function of n over the interval [0,2].
First, b(n) is a continuous and decreasing function of n in each of the three open or half-open
intervals [0,n), (n,n), and (n,2]. Consider b(n) for n ∈ [0,n). In this interval b(n) is continuous in n:
by the fundamental theorem of calculus, it is a continuous function of αBBSB(n), αBBBS(n), and
αSBSS(n), which are in turn continuous functions of n. From equation (22), by the fundamental
theorem of calculus and the chain rule of derivation, its derivative with respect to n can be written
b
′
(n)
∣∣∣
06n<n
=− α′BBSB(n)
1∫
0
f (αBBSB(n),α)dα− α′BBSB(n)
αSBSS(n)∫
αBBBS(n)
α f (αBBSB(n),α)dα
− α′BBBS(n) αBBBS(n)
1∫
αBBSB(n)
f (σ,αBBBS(n))dσ
− α′SBSS(n) αSBSS(n)
αBBSB(n)∫
0
f (σ,αSBSS(n))dσ ,
(b.2)
which is negative given that α′BBSB(n) > 0, α
′
BBBS(n) > 0 and α
′
SBSS(n) > 0. The continuity of
b(n) over the intervals (n,n) and (n,2] can be proven analogously.
Second, b(n) is continuous in n also at n = n and n = n. Consider the continuity of b(n) at
n = n. This follows from αSBSS(n) = αBBSS(n), the ranking αSBSS(n) > αBBBS(n) for any n,
35
and the definition of n such that αSBSS(n) = αBBSB(n). These three properties together imply
αmax min(n) = max (αBBBS(n), min (αSBSS(n),αBBSS(n)))
= max (αBBBS(n),αSBSS(n))
= αSBSS(n)
= αBBSB(n)
(b.3)
In equation (22) we see that the only difference between b(n)|06n<n and b(n)|n6n6n is that wher-
ever αBBSB(n) appears in b(n)|06n<n, αmax min(n) appears instead in b(n)|n6n6n. Since by equation
(b.3) αmax min(n) = αBBSB(n), it follows that
lim
n→n−
b(n) = b(n) = lim
n→n+
b(n) (b.4)
The continuity of b(n) at n = n can be proven analogously.
Since 1+ n2 is a continuous increasing function of n and b(n) is a continuous decreasing function
of n over the interval [0,2], it follows that b˜(n) = 1+ n2 − b(n) is a continuous increasing function
of n over this interval.
By equation (20), n = 0 implies ∆γ = 0; which in turn, by equations (3), (7), (10), (13), and (15),
implies αBBBS = αSBSS = αBSSS = αBBSS = αBBSB = 0; and substituting these into equation
(22) yields b(0) = 2; which, by equation (b.1), implies b˜(0) = −1. Moreover, since 1 + n2 takes
value 2 for n = 2, and since b(n) is decreasing in n over the interval [0,2] starting from the value
b(0) = 2, it follows that b˜(2) > 0
Since b˜(n) is a continuous function of n over the interval [0,2], b˜(0) < 0, and b˜(2) > 0, by
Bolzano’s Theorem there exists at least one value of n ∈ (0,2) such that b˜(n) = 0. This proofs that
an urban equilibrium exists. In addition, both the big and small cities are populated in equilibrium
(i.e., the equilibrium value of n satisfies 0 < n < 2 with strict inequality). The urban equilibrium
is also unique. Suppose on the contrary that there were two or more values of n in (0,2) such
that b˜(n) = 0. Then, by Rolle’s Theorem there would have to be some n in this interval such that
b˜′(n) = 0, which contradicts our previous result that b˜′(n) > 0 over the interval [0,2].
Turning to comparative statics, totally differentiating the equilibrium condition b˜(n) = 1+ n2 −
b(n) = 0 and solving for dndτ yields
dn
dτ
=
db(n)
dτ
b˜′(n)
. (b.5)
Since τ and n always enter b(n) together as a product (because ∆γ enters every threshold level of
α and, by equation 20, ∆γ = τn), it follows that db(n)dτ = b
′(n), and we have already shown that
b′(n) < 0. We have also shown that b˜′(n) > 0. Hence, we can sign equation (b.5): dndτ < 0. The
comparative statics dnd∆Ω > 0 and
dn
d∆e > 0 can be proven analogously.
Appendix C. Introducing uncertainty over junior workers’ self-assessment
For simplicity, in the main text we treat the situation in which self-confidence accurately reflects
ability as one where each worker knows her ability α with certainty; and we treat the situation
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in which self-confidence does not reflect ability accurately as one where each junior workers is
certain that her ability is σ (self-confidence) until she updates this belief to the actual value α while
attempting to complete a simple task.
In this appendix, we re-derive results allowing junior workers to realize their self-assessment
may be inaccurate. In this alternative formulation, accurate self-assessment does not imply that
each junior worker knows her ability α with certainty. Instead, she receives a signal that allows
her to compute an unbiased estimate of her ability, so that she takes her ability to have expected
value α and variance θ. The situation in which self-confidence does not reflect ability accurately
is modelled in this alternative formulation by having each worker receive a signal that leads her
to a possibly biased estimate of her ability. However, she realizes this self-assessment may be
inaccurate, and she takes her ability to have expected value σ 6= α and variance θ. We still
maintain the assumption that while trying to complete their simple task workers learn about their
true ability, so all senior workers know their α accurately.
Since senior workers know their ability, the senior location choice remains exactly as in the
main text and follows lemma 1, with the two thresholds on which senior-period location depends,
αBBBS and αSBSS, unchanged.
For the junior location choice, we need to consider the same three ranges of ability as before:
α 6 αBBBS, αBBBS < α 6 αSBSS, and αSBSS < α. For a worker with low ability α 6 αBBBS
locating in B when senior is never worthwhile regardless of her junior period location. She locates
in B in her junior period if and only if
E [UBS(α)−USS(α)] = (α2 + θ)ΩS(eB − eS)pi2 − (γB − γS) > 0 , (c.1)
or, equivalently, if and only if
α > αBSSS ≡
√
∆γ
ΩS pi2 ∆e
− θ . (c.2)
Compared with the value of αBSSS in equation (10), the only difference is the term−θ. Uncertainty
over ability and convexity lower the (expected) ability threshold above which a junior worker
locates in B.
For a worker with αBBBS < α 6 αSBSS locating in B when senior is worthwhile if she located
in B when junior and successfully completed her simple task. Knowing this, she locates in B in her
junior period if and only if
E [UBB(α)−USS(α)] = (α2 + θ)(ΩB eB −ΩS eS)pi2 − (1+ α)(γB − γS) > 0 , (c.3)
or, equivalently, if and only if
α > αBBSS ≡ 12
(
α˜+
√
α˜2 + 4 (α˜− θ)
)
, (c.4)
where α˜ is still defined as in equation (12). Compared with the value of αBBSS in equation (13),
the only difference is the term −θ.
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For a worker with high ability αSBSS < α locating in B when senior (conditional on junior
period success) is always worthwhile regardless of her junior period location. Knowing she will
locate in B when senior if successful, she locates in B in her junior period if and only if
E [UBB(α)−USB(α)] = (α2 + θ)ΩB(eB − eS)pi2 − (γB − γS) > 0 , (c.5)
or, equivalently, if and only if
α > αBBSB ≡
√
∆γ
ΩB pi2 ∆e
− θ . (c.6)
Compared with the value of αBBSB in equation (14), the only difference is the term −θ.
Lemma 2 still applies as before, but with the thresholds αBSSS, αBBSS, and αBBSB now defined
by equations (c.2), (c.4), and (c.6) respectively instead of by equations (10), (13), and (15).
The three cases in propositions 1 and 2 need to be redefined using the new values of the thresh-
olds. Case 1 arises when αSBSS < αBBSB. Substituting equations (7) and (c.6) into this inequality
and rearranging leads to the updated parameter condition defining case 1: ∆e
∆Ω2
< pi2 eS
2
ΩB ∆γ
− θ eS2 pi22 ∆e
∆γ2
.
Case 2 arises when αBBSB 6 αSBSS and αBBBS 6 αBSSS simultaneously. Substituting equa-
tions (3), (7), (c.2) and (c.6) into this inequality and rearranging leads to the updated parameter
condition defining case 2: pi2 eS
2
ΩB ∆γ
− θ eS2 pi22 ∆e
∆γ2
6 ∆e
∆Ω2
6 pi2 eB2ΩS ∆γ −
θ eB2 pi22 ∆e
∆γ2
. Case 3 arises when
αBSSS < αBBBS. Substituting equations (3) and (c.2) into this inequality and rearranging leads to
the updated parameter condition defining case 3: pi2 eB
2
ΩS ∆γ
− θ eB2 pi22 ∆e
∆γ2
< ∆e
∆Ω2
.
The proof of proposition 1 in appendix A and the proof of proposition 2 in the main text are still
valid with the updated values for the thresholds αBSSS, αBBSS, and αBBSB and the updated pa-
rameter conditions for each of the three cases. Thus all of our results are qualitatively unchanged.
The difference is that the (perceived) ability thresholds above which junior workers locate in B are
lower with uncertainty since utility is convex in ability (which matters in both periods, creating a
positive quadratic term in α). Furthermore, we can see from the updated parameter conditions for
each of the three cases that uncertainty increases the opportunity cost of foregoing possible better
experience in the bigger city (a positive θ creates an additional role for ∆e). Thus, the more noisy
is the signal young workers receive about their ability, the more likely they are to take the bet of
locating in a big city and seeing if it fulfils their dreams.
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Appendix D. Additional empirical results
Table D.1: Logit estimation of the determinants of location in big and small cities
nlsy79 Childrenof nlsy79
Probability Probability Probability Probability
of living of having of having of living
in big city moved to moved to in big city
upon big city small city upon
completing 10 years 10 years completing
education later later education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Self-confidence percentile 1.005 1.001 0.999 1.005
(0.002)∗∗∗ (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)∗∗
Cognitive ability percentile 0.999 1.006 1.001
(0.002) (0.003)∗∗ (0.004)
Price-theoretic skill percentile 1.003 1.005 0.998
(0.002) (0.003)∗∗ (0.003)
Math ability percentile 1.001
(0.003)
Reading recognition percentile 1.002
(0.003)
Reading comprehension percentile 0.997
(0.003)
Extraversion percentile 1.000
(0.002)
Agreeableness percentile 1.002
(0.002)
Conscientiousness percentile 0.996
(0.002)∗∗
Emotional stability percentile 0.999
(0.002)
Openness to experiences percentile 1.004
(0.002)
High-school graduate 0.946 0.788 0.761 1.078
(0.140) (0.178) (0.197) (0.133)
Some college 0.971 1.418 0.780 1.051
(0.176) (0.384) (0.216) (0.202)
College graduate 2.196 1.790 0.890 2.337
(0.561)∗∗∗ (0.524)∗∗ (0.271) (0.684)∗∗∗
Number of children 0.998 0.877 1.161 0.926
(0.034) (0.061)∗ (0.077)∗∗ (0.047)
Living in small city at age 14 0.018 0.291 3.279 0.009
(0.004)∗∗∗ (0.075)∗∗∗ (0.800)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗
N 4,614 2,711 1,629 4,336
Pseudo R2 0.465 0.080 0.083 0.565
Notes: Odd ratios (exponentiated coefficients) are reported, with coefficients above one indicating a positive effect and
coefficients below one indicating a negative effect. All specifications include a constant, indicator variables for female,
black, Hispanic, marital status and birth-year. Columns (2) and (3) also include labor market variables as in table
1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the metropolitan area level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Price-theoretic skill follows Eeckhout, Pinheiro, and Schmidheiny (2014). Math,
reading recognition and reading comprehension percentiles use results from Peabody International Achievement tests.
Personality percentiles are obtained using the Ten-Item Personality Inventory measure.
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